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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, * 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 920381-CA 
v. t 
ELROY BARLOW, t Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant.: 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction of criminal 
nonsupport, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-7-201 (1990). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Was there sufficient evidence to support a 
conviction of criminal nonsupport? When reviewing the 
sufficiency of the evidence in a jury trial, this Court must 
review the evidence and the inferences which may reasonably be 
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict. State v. Burk, 198 Utah Adv. Rep. 60, 62 (Utah App. 
Oct. 23, 1992). This Court will reverse a conviction "only when 
the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of 
which he was convicted." .Id. (quoting State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 
1386, 1387 (Utah App. 1991)). Accord State v. Vigil, 197 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 18, 20 (Utah App. Oct. 7, 1992). 
2. Did either the prosecutor's attempts to adduce 
evidence concerning support arrearages and payments occurring 
outside the charged period or his references to a pre-trial 
meeting with defendant constitute prosecutorial misconduct 
warranting reversal of defendant's conviction? This Court need 
not review the allegations concerning the support arrearages and 
payments outside the charged period as they are raised for the 
first time on appeal. State v. Cummins, 194 Utah Adv. Rep. 48, 
49-51 (Utah App. Aug. 25, 1992). The trial court ruled on the 
allegations concerning the pretrial meeting in response to 
defendant's motion for a mistrial made below; therefore, this 
Court reviews the issue for an abuse of discretion. See Vigil, 
197 Utah Adv. Rep. at 22 (prosecutorial misconduct claim on 
appeal reviewed for abuse of discretion where trial court ruled 
on the issue at the post-conviction motions hearing); State v. 
Boone. 820 P.2d 930, 932 (Utah App. 1991) (reviewing denial of 
motions for a mistrial and for a new trial for an abuse of 
discretion). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-7-201 (1990)s 
(1) A person commits criminal nonsupport if, 
having a spouse or children under the age of sixteen 
years, he knowingly and without just cause fails to 
provide for the support of the spouse or children when 
either is in needy circumstances. 
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3), 
criminal nonsupport is a class A misdemeanor. 
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(5) In a prosecution under this section, it is no 
defense that the person to be supported received 
necessary support from a source other than the 
defendant. 
The text of other relevant constitutional, statutory, 
or rule provision pertinent to the resolution of the issues 
presented on appeal is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant Elroy Barlow was charged by information with 
criminal nonsupport, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. S 76-7-201 (1990) (R. 1-3). The matter was tried to a 
jury on March 2, 1991 (R. 50-51). During the jury's 
deliberations, defendant moved for a mistrial based on 
allegations of prosecutorial misconduct (Trial Transcript 
[hereinafter Tr.] at 164-65). The trial court denied the motion 
(Tr. at 166). After the jury rendered its guilty verdict (R. 
103; Tr. at 167), defendant made a motion for a directed verdict 
which was taken under advisement and later briefed and argued as 
a motion to arrest judgment (R. 118-29, 130-36; Tr. at 169; 
Sentencing Transcript [hereinafter Sent. Tr.] at 2-7). He 
contended only that the State had failed to establish that his 
failure to make full child support payments occurred "without 
just cause" (R. 118-29). The court denied defendant's motion and 
sentenced him to serve one year in the Salt Lake County Jail, and 
to pay fines and fees amounting to $2,500.00 (R. 137-39; Sent. 
Tr. at 12). The court then suspended all but 30 days of the jail 
sentence, all but $200.00 of the fines, and all but $350.00 of 
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the fees, and placed defendant on probation for 18 months (R. 
137-39; Sent, Tr. at 12). Defendant timely filed his notice of 
appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts are recited in the light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. Burk, 198 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 60 (Utah App. Oct. 23, 1992); State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 
1150, 1153 (Utah 1991). 
Defendant was charged with criminal nonsupport based on 
his failure to make the full court-ordered child support payments 
required for the months of January through August, 1991 (R. 1-3). 
The parties verbally stipulated to the following facts at trial: 
1. Defendant and his ex-wife Kathleen Barlow 
had two children at the time they were 
divorced, and the divorce decree contained an 
order that defendant pay $150.00 per month 
per child for child support, for a total 
obligation of $300.00 per month (Tr. at 48); 
2. Defendant made no payments of child 
support for the months of January, March, 
June, July, and August, 1991; he paid $218.00 
in February 1991, $55.00 in April 1991, and 
$164.00 in May 1991 (Tr. at 50-52); 
3. Both of defendant's children were in 
needy circumstances between January and 
August 1991 (Tr. at 52-53). 
During the period with which defendant was charged, he 
worked for M & R Enterprises [hereinafter M & R], an auto body 
business owned by his current wife and for which he was the 
primary laborer (Tr. at 57, 87-88, 90-91, 108, 118). His ex-
wife, Kathleen Barlow, testified that defendant had owned and 
operated an auto body business during their seven-year marriage 
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and that M & R was located at the same location as the previous 
business (Tr. at 58, lllf 121). 
Defendant, the sole defense witness, admitted that he 
knew what he was required to pay for child support pursuant to 
the divorce decree (Tr. at 90, 107), and that he knew that he had 
not made the full payments required by the decree throughout the 
period specified in the information (Tr. at 107). He contended 
that he was unable to work during the charged period due to a 
series of illnesses which kept him at home or in bed and for 
which he claimed to have seen numerous doctors: a migraine with 
physical pain and vomiting in January and February (Tr. at 95-
97); cellulitis in March and April (Tr. at 97-103); shingles in 
July (Tr. at 103-05). He testified on direct examination that he 
had personally met with the prosecutor prior to the filing of the 
instant charges and explained his medical situation, the 
difficulties he faced, and his inability to pay support (Tr. at 
105-07, 111). He further indicated that he had maintained his 
job with M & R during his illnesses, that M & R ceased doing auto 
body work in August 1991 (Tr. at 105, 115, 117), that he remained 
employed by M & R during September (Tr. at 115), that it was his 
only job during the period charged in the information (Tr. at 
102), and that as of trial in March 1992, it remained his only 
job despite the fact that it had not yet reopened as a consulting 
business (Tr. at 115, 117). 
Crystal Ann Larsen, an investigative technician for the 
Office of Recovery Services, locates the business addresses of 
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persons who are delinquent in their child support payments (Tr. 
at 76). Ms. Larsen answered a phone call from Kathleen Barlow on 
September 13, 1991, which prompted her to call M & R Enterprises 
to find out if defendant was there (Tr. at 77-78, 80, 105-06). 
Defendant answered the phone, told Ms. Larsen that his wife owned 
M & R, and said that he helped to run the business (Tr. at 87-88, 
105-06, 115). 
Following exhaustion of all civil avenues of collecting 
the unpaid child support, the State Office of Recovery Services 
forwarded defendant's case file to criminal nonsupport agent 
Leslie Hunter for criminal investigation (Tr. at 62, 65-66). Ms. 
Hunter researched the case to determine whether to file criminal 
charges (jLd.). She testified at trial that when an individual 
who has not been paying court-ordered support has been ill or 
injured, the agency investigates to see if the illness or injury 
made the individual unemployable, and, if so, it does not pursue 
criminal charges (Tr. at 68-69). She explained that she 
conducted a standard investigation, determined why the payments 
in this case had not been made (Tr. at 64-65, 69), then filed the 
charges against defendant (Tr. at 62). 
On September 26, 1991, Officer Kelly Page of the Murray 
City Police Department drove to 4195 South 500 West, Unit 54, 
Murray, responding to a radio dispatch which said that defendant 
might be found at a shop at that address (Tr. at 71-72). When he 
arrived, he found defendant working on a pickup truck inside the 
building in a shop apparently set up and operable (Tr. at 72-73), 
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with an office in which several items from M & R were located, 
including the phone (Tr. at 72-73, 116).l Defendant was 
arrested thereafter (R. 10). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant conceded below that he knew he did not make 
complete payments of his support obligation, thereby waiving 
appellate review of the issue. That his failure to pay occurred 
•'without just cause" was established by the evidence and the 
reasonable inferences therefrom concerning his experience, 
expertise and ability to earn an income during part or all of the 
charged period, his conscious choice to remain employed solely by 
his wife's business despite his knowledge that he was not making 
a sufficient income to pay his child support or his rent, and 
defendant's lack of any physical illness during two of the 
charged months. 
Defendant waived presentation of his prosecutorial 
misconduct challenges regarding the prosecutor's efforts to 
adduce evidence concerning payments or the lack of payments 
outside the charged period by failing to raise the issues in his 
motion for a mistrial before the trial court. The remaining 
three remarks made by the prosecutor regarding a pre-trial 
meeting between the prosecutor and defendant either were proper 
1
 The officer could not remember the name of the shop (Tr. at 
72). Defendant contended that it was not M & R but was K. B. Auto 
Sales, although he answered the phone on behalf of M & R (Tr. at 
115-16). 
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inferences to be argued from the evidence or were harmless and, 
hence, do not warrant reversal of defendant's conviction. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION 
Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient 
to support the jury's guilty verdict because there was no 
evidence to establish that his failure to pay child support was 
either knowing or without just cause* 
A. Defendant Failed to Preserve his Challenge to the Knowledge 
Element 
By his express concession below, defendant has waived 
his claim that the State failed to adduce any proof that he 
"knowingly failed to provide for the children's support" as 
required by Utah Code Ann, § 76-7-201 (1990). During oral 
argument on his motion to arrest judgment below, defendant made 
the following representation to the court: 
• • . . [T]he State has the burden of proving 
each and every element of the crime as listed 
in the statute, and there are four; that he 
has children under 16 years of age, which we 
conceded; and that he knowingly failed to 
provide for their support, and I suppose to 
some extent, we conceded that he didn't pay 
the money that Thel was reguired to pay; that 
his failure to provide the support was 
without lust cause, and I think that is the 
element that we did not concede, and that is 
the element that I contend the State did not 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt with any 
evidence. (Emphasis added). 
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(Sent. Tr. at 3). In both his oral argument and his supporting 
memorandum, defendant argued only that the evidence failed to 
establish that the lack of payments occurred "without just cause" 
(R. 118-29; Sent. Tr. at 3 [copies of these parts of the record 
and the trial court's ruling are attached hereto as Addendum A]). 
Accordingly, this Court need not consider defendant's argument 
concerning the knowledge element. State v. Sepulveda, No. 
920163-CA, slip op. at 7-8 (Utah App. Nov. 19, 1992) (amended 
opinion); State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 248 & n.2 (Utah App. 
1992); State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App. 1991). 
Defendant has argued neither plain error nor exceptional 
circumstances, the only recognized exceptions to the waiver rule. 
Archambeau, 820 P.2d at 926. Consequently, this Court should not 
review this claim. Sepulveda, slip op. at 8. 
B. There was Sufficient Evidence from which the Jury Could have 
Found the Element of "Without Just Cause" 
Defendant argues that the evidence was necessarily 
insufficient because without proof that defendant had the ability 
to work and earn income or that he had the resources to pay the 
full support obligation, the State did not establish that the 
failure to pay was "without just cause" (Brf. of App. at ll).2 
As defendant recognizes, appellate review of a claim of 
insufficient evidence in a jury trial dictates that this Court 
2
 Defendant does not contend on appeal, as he did below, that 
the State failed to adduce sufficient evidence to send the matter 
to the jury. Here, he challenges the sufficiency of all the 
evidence to sustain the conviction. 
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view the evidence and the reasonable inferences which may be 
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict. State v. Burk, 198 Utah Adv. Rep. 60, 62 (Utah App. 
Oct. 23, 1992). The conviction may be reversed "only when the 
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which 
he was convicted." Id. (quoting State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386, 
1387 (Utah App. 1991)). Accord State v. Vigil, 197 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 18, 20 (Utah App. Oct. 7, 1992). Defendant must marshal all 
the evidence that supports the verdict, and show that the 
evidence is insufficient, even viewed in a light most favorable 
to the verdict. Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 
1985); Vigil, 197 Utah Adv. Rep. at 20; State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 
732, 738-39 (Utah App. 1990). He has not carried that burden. 
There was sufficient evidence adduced below from which 
the jury could determine that defendant's failure to pay his 
support obligation occurred without just cause. Actual 
possession of the financial resources to pay the obligation is 
not required for criminal liability; an unutilized ability to 
obtain the funds will suffice. See, e.g., Rockwood v. Rockwood, 
65 Utah 261, 268, 236 P. 457, 464 (1925) (a parent has a 
statutory and moral duty to support his children, if he is able 
to do so); Burbidge v. Utah Light & Traction Co., 57 Utah 566, 
570, 196 P. 556, 558 (1921) (a parent has a legal duty to support 
his minor children); State v. Bess, 44 Utah 39, 46, 49-50, 137 P. 
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829, 832, 833-34 (1913) (under former penal code provision 
encompassing this offense, one who was able to have obtained 
employment but did not could be criminally liable). 
The evidence below indicated that defendant clearly had 
the ability to earn an income. Defendant was employed and had a 
job available to him throughout the charged period. He possessed 
marketable skills and had the general ability to earn an income 
during the time in question: he was experienced in auto body and 
paint work, auto sales and auto brokering (Tr. at 57, 91, 110-
11); he owned and operated his own auto body business during his 
previous seven-year marriage to Kathleen Barlow (Tr. at 57, 111, 
121); and he was the primary worker and equitable owner of M & R 
Enterprises, doing auto body repair while his current wife 
administered the business (Tr. at 90-91, 108, 118). Given his 
experience, his level of expertise and his occupation as M & R's 
primary laborer during the charged period, the jury could 
reasonably have inferred that defendant was generally able to 
earn an income during the charged period. 
The evidence also established that defendant did not 
fully use his ability to earn an income, choosing instead to 
remain self-employed in a business which could not pay him enough 
to cover either his rent or his support obligations. Despite his 
expertise and marketable skills, defendant had no income 
independent of M & R (Tr. at 102), while his current wife ran the 
business and generated additional income through another job (Tr. 
at 90-91, 108). Defendant admitted that he was evicted for 
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failing to pay his rent (Tr. at 115, 118); yet, despite his 
confessed inability to meet his financial obligations, he 
continued in the "employ" of M & R, regardless of the fact that M 
& R operated at a loss during 1991 (Tr. at 117), ceased doing 
auto body work in August 1991, and had not reopened as a 
consulting business as of the time of trial in March 1992, and 
regardless of the fact that he was physically able to use his 
skills at least during September 1991 (Tr. at 72-73, 115-16). 
This evidence allows the reasonable inference that defendant 
intentionally remained self-employed with M & R with the 
knowledge that he would not be able to meet his financial 
obligations. 
The only indication before the jury that defendant 
either did not have or was prevented from using the ability to 
earn the necessary income to make full support payments was 
defendant's own testimony that a series of illnesses rendered him 
physically unable to work. The jury, not this Court, has the 
responsibility to weigh the evidence and determine the 
credibility of the witnesses. State v. Jonas,. 793 P.2d 902, 904-
05 (Utah App. 1990); State v. Lactod, 761 P.2d 23, 27 (Utah App. 
1988). The jury may have chosen to disregard defendant's self-
serving testimony concerning repeated illnesses throughout the 
eight-month period charged in the information. This does not 
require that the verdict be overturned on appeal so long as the 
remaining evidence and reasonable inferences support the 
conviction. Jonas, 793 P.2d at 905; Lactod, 761 P.2d at 27-28. 
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The remaining evidence in this case is sufficient to enable the 
jury to reasonably find all the requisite elements of the crime 
for which defendant was convicted. 
Even if the jury credited defendant's testimony, the 
evidence supports the guilty verdict. The nonsupport statute 
allows for criminal liability for even a single failure to 
provide adequate support. The jury was instructed, without 
objection, that the offense "is committed not only where there is 
a complete failure to support the child, but also where there is 
a partial failure to provide for the children, so long as the 
support furnished is not adequate under the circumstances" (R. 
63, copy attached hereto as part of Addendum B). The jury was 
also instructed that a conviction was warranted if it found the 
requisite elements for "any month or combination of months during 
the time period charged" (R. 59, copy attached hereto as part of 
Addendum B). Defendant testified that the cellulitis he had in 
March and April did not affect him in May and that the next 
illness he contracted was shingles in July (Tr. at 98-103). 
Accordingly, the jury could have found from the evidence and the 
reasonable inferences therefrom that during May, when defendant 
made a partial support payment, and June, when he made no 
payment, defendant was physically able to work, had marketable 
skills with which to earn an income, but chose to remain employed 
in a business which generated no profit, thereby supporting a 
determination that his failure to make adequate support payments 
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at least during May and June occurred without just cause in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-201. 
In marshaling the evidence, defendant places 
unwarranted emphasis on the fact that the State's witnesses at 
trial did not conduct their investigations during the charged 
period. This is not fatal to the State's case but is merely a 
factor to be considered by the jury. If, as defendant suggests, 
relevant evidence is rendered irrelevant because it is discovered 
outside the charged period, a parent could never be criminally 
charged for missing a single month's payment as the investigation 
necessarily would occur after the month's end. The State's 
witnesses candidly described their investigative roles and 
specifically indicated that investigation was in fact performed 
by appropriate individuals both during and after the charged 
period (Tr. at 62, 64-65, 66, 81-83, 85-86). 
POINT II 
ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCT BASED ON 
PROSECUTORIAL REFERENCES TO ARREARAGES AND 
PAYMENTS OUTSIDE THE CHARGED PERIOD ARE NOT 
PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT; FURTHER, THE 
PROSECUTOR'S REFERENCES TO THE PRE-TRIAL 
MEETING DO NOT WARRANT REVERSAL OF 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION 
Defendant contends that he is entitled to reversal of 
his conviction based on alleged prosecutorial misconduct which 
occurred during the trial and in the prosecutor's closing 
remarks. Defendant claims as misconduct the prosecutor's 
attempts to produce evidence relating to support arrearages and 
14 
payments occurring outside the charged period and the 
prosecutor's references to his pre-trial meeting with defendant• 
A> Attempt to Introduce Arrearage Evidence 
During his cross-examination of defendant, the 
prosecutor asked if defendant had tried to catch up on his 
support payments since the charges had been filed (Tr. at 116; a 
copy of the text is attached hereto as part of Addendum C). 
Defense counsel objected based on relevance before an answer was 
given, and the court sustained the objection (Tr. at 116; 
Addendum C). An unrecorded side-bar conference then occurred, 
after which the court overruled the objection and permitted the 
prosecutor to ask the question (Tr. at 116-17; Addendum C). 
However, the question was not asked a second time, and no 
response from defendant was ever obtained (Tr. at 116-17; 
Addendum C). Thereafter, following defendant's testimony and 
outside the presence of the jury, the prosecutor endeavored to 
present rebuttal evidence regarding child support arrearages 
occurring prior to the charged period (Tr. at 121-23, 131, 162-
64; a copy of the relevant text is attached hereto as part of 
Addendum C).3 Defendant now characterizes both the question to 
defendant and the attempt to present the rebuttal evidence as 
prosecutorial misconduct (Brf. of App. at 25, 30 n.20). However, 
this Court may decline to reach either allegation. When 
3
 Both prior to and during trial, outside the presence of the 
jury, the court indicated that such evidence may be admissible as 
rebuttal evidence depending on the testimony adduced at trial (Tr. 
at 127-28; Motion Transcript at 2; February 28 Transcript at 2-3). 
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presenting his prosecutorial misconduct argument to the trial 
court in support of his motion for a mistrial, defendant failed 
to reference either instance and did not otherwise identify this 
conduct to the trial court as prosecutorial misconduct. Further, 
he has not argued either plain error or exceptional circumstances 
to excuse his failure to raise the allegations below. 
Consequently, neither allegation of misconduct may be asserted on 
appeal. State v. Whittle, 780 P.2d 819, 819-21 (Utah 1989); 
State v. Cummins, 194 Utah Adv. Rep. 48, 49-51 (Utah App. Aug. 
25, 1992) (specific instances of alleged misconduct which were 
not included in motion for mistrial made to trial court and did 
not constitute plain error did not warrant review); State v. Day, 
815 P.2d 1345, 1350 (Utah App. 1991) (failure to object to 
prosecutor's statement below waives issue on appeal); see also 
Sepulveda, slip op. at 8. 
Further, this Court may refuse to reach either issue 
based on defendant's violation of this Court's briefing rule. 
Ut. R. App. P. 24. Defendant quotes the prosecutor's question to 
defendant (Brf. of App. at 25), and notes the prosecutor's 
attempts to present rebuttal testimony (id. at 30 n.20), but 
fails to include in his analysis any argument or supporting 
authority regarding either allegation. Accordingly, this Court 
should not reach these claims. See State v. Mincv, 192 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 17, 23 n.l (Utah App. July 22, 1992) (Court declined to 
reach defendant's challenge to the photo spread absent legal 
analysis or authority to support the issue); Price, 827 P.2d at 
16 
248-50 & n.5 (Court refused to reach issue of consent to search 
where defendant presented no record cites or legal analysis); see 
also State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984) (Court 
declined to rule on a separation of powers issue which was not 
supported by legal analysis or authority). 
B. Statements Regarding Pre-trial Meeting 
Defendant identifies three references made by the 
prosecutor concerning a pre-trial meeting between the prosecutor 
and the defendant: an exchange during the prosecutor's cross-
examination of defendant and two statements in the prosecutor's 
closing remarks• Defendant argued below that the repeated 
references to the meeting constituted prosecutorial misconduct, 
warranting a mistrial (Tr. at 164-65; a copy of the text and the 
trial court's ruling is attached hereto as Addendum D). The 
trial court found 
For the record, whether the Court feels that what Mr, 
Hunt argued was proper or improper, it was Mr. Barlow 
who testified himself, on the stand, that he had had 
discussions with Mr. Hunt at the office in regards to 
his inability to pay, if I remember the testimony 
correctly. 
I think that Mr. Hunt was cut off at a point that 
wasn't prejudicial to the defendant, and I think the 
Court also, in the course of the argument, gave the 
jury an oral question or instruction in the fact that 
what Mr. Hunt was saying was not testimony here today, 
he was not under oath, and in one instance, that they 
were to disregard what was said. 
The Court does not feel that what occurred arose 
to the threshold point of intentional or even 
inadvertentness or prosecutorial misconduct, and 
doesn't feel that a mistrial would be appropriate under 
these circumstances. 
(Tr. at 166; Addendum D). 
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Because the trial court ruled on this issue in the 
context of defendant's motion for a mistrial below, this Court 
reviews the issue for an abuse of discretion. See Vigil, 197 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 22; State v. Boone, 820 P.2d 930, 932 (Utah 
App. 1991). 
This Court will reverse a conviction due to 
prosecutorial misconduct only where the defendant establishes 
that the prosecutor's statements are both improper and 
prejudicial. Vigil, 197 Utah Adv. Rep. at 22; State v. Span, 819 
P.2d 329, 333-36 (Utah 1991). The prosecutor's statements are 
improper if they call to the attention of the jurors matters 
which they would not be justified in considering in determining 
their verdict. State v. Trov, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984); 
State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 786 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 
817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991); State v. Lopez, 789 P.2d 39, 45 (Utah 
App. 1990). The statements are prejudicial if, under the 
circumstances of the particular case, their effect was 
substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that without the statements the result would have been 
more favorable for the defendant. Harrison, 805 P.2d at 786; 
Lopez, 789 P.2d at 45. When reviewing prejudice, this Court may 
compare the likely impact of the remarks with the remaining 
evidence to determine if the jury would have been more likely to 
acquit defendant based on the remaining evidence if the remarks 
had not been made. Harrison, 805 P.2d at 787. 
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As the trial court recognized, defendant initially 
raised the issue of the pre-trial meeting between himself and the 
prosecutor. On direct examination, defendant testified that he 
had met with the prosecutor sometime before trial and had told 
the prosecutor about his medical problems, related that he had 
been having "a real hard time", and explained that he could not 
make the required payments (Tr. at 106-07). 
The prosecutor's first reference to this meeting 
occurred during his cross-examination of defendant: 
Q [BY PROSECUTOR]. Now, you—you related to the 
jury a meeting that you and I had in my office— 
A. Un huh (affirmative). 
Q. —some months ago. And you remember that 
meeting? 
A. Un huh (affirmative). 
Q. Okay. And that was prior to our office filing 
these charges in this matter, wasn't it? 
A. Right. That's right. 
Q. And that was an attempt— 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, your Honor. 
Objection. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q. (By [PROSECUTOR]) During that meeting, during 
the that meeting [sic], did I attempt to work out— 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. Could we 
approach? 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
(Whereupon, an off-the-record discussion was 
held at side bar.) 
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THE COURT: The jury will disregard the last 
question. 
(Tr. at 111-12). The prosecutor then proceeded on a different 
subject. The only information in this exchange challenged by 
defendant is the reference to an "attempt to work out". However, 
this reference is an appropriate matter for cross-examination in 
this case. Defendant's testimony during direct examination, 
which revealed both his meeting with the prosecutor and his 
explanation to the prosecutor of his illnesses and his difficult 
circumstances, raised the reasonable inference that defendant had 
tried to resolve the situation at the meeting to no avail. 
Consequently, it is a proper subject to be raised in cross-
examination of defendant. See State v. Adams, 26 Utah 2d 377, 
380-81, 489 P.2d 1191, 1193-94 (1971) (permitting cross-
examination on matters introduced by defendant on direct 
examination in a manner intended to show his own good nature and 
the officers' unjustifiable actions so long as the cross 
examination tends to challenge, contradict or explain defendant's 
assertions); State v. Tucker. 800 P.2d 819, 823 (Utah App. 1990) 
(permitting cross-examination into prior criminal charges which 
were raised and minimized by defendant on direct). However, 
whether or not the statement was proper, it was not prejudicial 
because it is unlikely that absent the uncompleted phrase the 
jury would have acquitted defendant. The statement was never 
completed, no terms were mentioned, and defendant's response to 
the "attempt" was not revealed. The possibility of any 
speculation regarding the details of any attempted resolution or 
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of defendant's unspoken response was minimized by defendant's 
prompt objections, which prevented completion of the question and 
forestalled any response, and the court's immediate, express 
instruction to disregard the reference. Further, the jury was 
expressly instructed that they "should not consider, nor be 
influenced by . . • any statement of counsel of facts not shown 
in evidence," (R. 71; a copy is attached hereto as part of 
Addendum E), that they "are not to consider evidence offered but 
not admitted, nor any evidence stricken out by the court," and, 
"as to any question to which an objection was sustained, you must 
not conjecture as to what the answer might have been or as to the 
reason for the objection" (R. 73; a copy is attached hereto as 
part of Addendum E). Consequently, even allowing, arguendo, that 
the statement is improper, it would be harmless. See Span, 819 
P.2d at 335; State v. Peters, 796 P.2d 708, 712 (Utah App. 1990). 
The prosecutor's second reference to the meeting 
occurred during his initial closing remarks; 
[THE PROSECUTOR:] . . . [Defendant] has told me in the 
past, before I filed this matter, that he has been sick 
and been ill, and he's testified as to that. And he 
testified as to a meeting that he had with me early on, 
and I—I have known a bit that he has been in the 
doctors on occasions in the past. He's never provided 
me with any evidence of such, but— 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, your Honor. 
Objection• 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
You can't testify here today. This is argument of 
stuff that's been introduced into evidence. 
The jury will disregard any testimony that seems 
to be being offered by the attorney. 
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Mr. Hunt, please limit your argument to what has 
been testified hereto. 
(Tr. at 149-50). In closing remarks, counsel for both sides may 
discuss fully from their standpoints the evidence and the 
inferences and deductions arising therefrom. State v. Valdez, 30 
Utah 2d 54, 60, 513 P.2d 422, 426 (1973); State v. Seel, 827 P.2d 
954, 959 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 
1992). 
The prosecutor's reference to his own knowledge of 
defendant's visits to various doctors is inappropriate as his 
knowledge was not put in evidence. However, the statement is 
harmless because it merely corroborates defendant's own testimony 
concerning his numerous visits to doctors. Consequently, even 
absent the statement, the substance of the remark would remain 
before the jury, and the verdict would not likely have been more 
favorable for defendant. 
Similarly, the prosecutor's remark concerning 
defendant's failure to provide him with evidence of his visits to 
any doctors is not an appropriate matter for the jury's 
consideration. However, under the circumstances of this case, it 
is a harmless remark which does not warrant reversal of 
defendant's conviction. Any potential prejudice was mitigated by 
defendant's timely objection before the remark was completed and 
by the court's immediate admonition to the jury to disregard the 
remark. The jury instructions expressly admonished the jury to 
disregard any evidence stricken by the court and to reject any 
statements of counsel of facts not shown in evidence. See 
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Addendum E. The instructions also clearly informed the jury that 
the State carried the burden of establishing all of the elements 
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, that the burden of proof 
never shifts to defendant, and that defendant does not have any 
responsibility to call witnesses or produce evidence (R. 58, 67; 
copies are attached hereto as Addendum F). Finally, there was 
adequate evidence to support the conviction regardless of the 
impropriety of this remark. Assuming the jury would have 
believed all of defendant's testimony absent this remark, they 
would reasonably have convicted him for his failure to provide 
adequate support during May and June, months in which illness did 
not prevent him from using his expertise and skills to obtain 
sufficient funds to meet his obligations. See Point I, above. 
These circumstances combine to render harmless the prosecutor's 
remark concerning the lack of pre-trial evidence. 
The prosecutor's third reference to the pre-trial 
meeting occurred in his final remarks: 
[THE PROSECUTOR:] The State has known, contrary 
to what defense counsel asserts, the State has known 
that [defendant] was going to claim that he had been to 
doctors before. [Defendant] himself testified that he 
met with me prior to this action. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection again, your Honor. 
[THE PROSECUTOR]: He—they opened the door, that 
draws an objection the first time, and they opened the 
door, your Honor. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge—-
THE COURT: Well, that was his testimony. I'll 
let you argue the testimony, Mr. [Prosecutor], but this 
is only closing argument. Okay? 
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(Tr. at 157-58). Defendant points out that none of the State's 
witnesses testified about his medical problems or going to 
doctors (Brf. of App. at 26 n.14). However, those witnesses 
testified that the State had conducted an investigation and knew 
of the reasons for the inadequate support payments, and defendant 
testified that he had personally explained his medical problems 
to the prosecutor. This evidence gives rise to the reasonable 
inference that the State was alerted to the defendant's claims of 
illness. Further, the statement does not call the jurors' 
attention to matters which may not be considered. Consequently, 
there is no impropriety or prejudice warranting reversal. See 
Day, 815 P.2d at 1350. 
Because none of the prosecutor's remarks warrant 
reversal of defendant's conviction, the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a mistrial. See 
Vigil, 197 Utah Adv. Rep. at 22; Boone, 820 P.2d at 932. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, the State 
respectfully requests that this Court affirm defendant's 
conviction for criminal nonsupport. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this / ^ d a y of December, 1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
KRIS C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
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IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
:..••- ' :•••'•'"t-'.v.r 
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT -••«-':., 
STATE OF UTAH, : MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
: OF MOTION TO ARREST JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff, 
v. : 
ELROY BARLOW, : Case No. 911011470MS 
: JUDGE DENNIS M. FUCHS 
Defendant. 
Elroy Barlow, through his attorney, RICHARD P. MAURO, 
hereby submits the following Tnemorandum in support of his Motion to 
Arrest Judgment pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 23.1. 
*Rule 23 provides that: 
At any time prior to the imposition of 
sentence, the court upon its own initiative 
may, or upon motion of defendant shall, 
arrest judgment if the facts proved or 
admitted do not constitute a public offense, 
or the defendant is mentally ill, or there 
is other good cause for the arrest of 
judgment. Upon arresting judgment the court 
may, unless a judgment of acquittal of the 
offense charged is entered or jeopardy has 
attached, order a commitment until the 
defendant is charged anew or retried, or may 
enter any other order as may be just and 
proper under the circumstances. 
FACTS 
On March 3, 1992, Elroy Barlow was tried and convicted by a 
jury of one count of criminal non-support in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-7-201 (1990). The State alleged that Mr. Barlow knowingly 
and without just cause failed to pay child support from January 1991 
to August 1991, a period of eight months. (A copy of the 
Information is attached hereto and marked exhibit •A"). 
Four witnesses testified for the State. Kathleen Barlow# 
Elroy's ex-wife, testified that her children were in needy 
circumstances, and that she had received only partial payments 
during the eight month period.2 Leslie Hunter, a criminal 
non-support investigator, testified that Mr. Barlow made partial 
payments of $218.00 in February 1991, $55 in April, 1991, and $164 
in May, 1991. She testified he made no payments in January, March, 
June, July, and August. 
Crystal Larsen, a state investigator testified that she 
spoke with Mr. Barlow by phone in late September, 1991. Mr. Barlow 
apparently told Larsen that his current wife owns M & R Enterprises, 
but that he helps run it. Finally, Murray Police 
2Mr. Barlow stipulated that he was divorced from Kathleen 
Barlow, that two children were born durinq the marriage, and that 
the total monthly support obligation was $300 per month. Mr. Barlow 
also stipulated that he made no payment in January, $218 in 
February, no payment in March, $55 in April, $164 in May, and no 
payments in June, July, and August. 
- 2 -
Officer Kelly Page testified that he arrested Mr. Barlow on 
September 26, 1991. The arrest was made at 4195 South 500 West, 
#54. None of the State's witnesses testified about Mr. Barlow's 
earning capabilities and nor did the State introduce evidence 
regarding Barlow's earnings. 
Mr. Barlow also testified. He told the jury about numerous 
hospital visits during the eight month period. He stated that he 
suffered from migraine headaches, pneumonia, vomiting, shingles, and 
cellulitis; he also testified that he was not able to work during 
several of the months in question, and thus had no income to make 
child support payments. Furthermore, during cross-examination, he 
told the prosecutor that he was evicted from his home during the 
eight month period. 
I. The State Failed to Sufficient Evidence to Support the 
Conviction. 
A. Elements of the Offense 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-7-201 sets forth the elements of criminal 
non-support: 
A person commits criminal nonsupport if, 
having . . . children under the age of 
sixteen years, he knowingly and without just 
cause fails to provide for the support of 
the . . . children when . . . in needy 
circumstances. 
The burden of proving each element of a crime rests with 
the state. United States Constitution, Amends., V, VI, XIV; Utah 
Constitution, Art. I, S 12; Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-501 (1990), 
In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). A defendant can 
never be compelled to testify nor can he be required to present 
evidence.3 if a defendant asserts an affirmative defensef he must 
only produce "some evidence [of the affirmative defense] if there is 
no evidence in the prosecution's case . . . ." State v. Tebbs, 786 
P.2d 775, 779 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). The prosecution still has the 
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the affirmative 
offense does not exist. Id. 
B. Burden of Proof in Utah 
The Utah Criminal Non-support statute requires the State to 
prove four elements: 
(1) that Mr. Barlow has children under sixteen years of 
age; 
(2) that Mr. Barlow knowingly failed to provide for their 
support, (emphasis added). 
(3) that Mr. Barlow's failure to provide support was 
without just cause (emphasis added). 
3A limited exception to this rule exists in the area of 
affirmative defenses. See 76-1-502 (1990) (defendant never required 
to prove his innocence, but he must present some evidence of 
affirmative defense). The Utah legislature has recognized seven 
affirmative defenses: (1) compulsion (S 76-2-302); (2) entrapment 
(S 76-2-303); (3) ignorance or mistake of fact or law (§ 76-2-304); 
(4) mistake as to victim's age (S 76-2-304.5); (5) mental illness 
(§ 76-2-305); (6) Voluntary Intoxication (S 76-2-306); voluntary 
termination of efforts (S 76-2-307). None of the affirmative 
defenses are applicable here. 
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(4) that Mr. Barlow's children were in needy 
circumstances.4 
C. Without Just Cause 
The State presented no evidence to show that Mr. Barlow's 
failure to pay was without just cause. Indeed, the State witnesses 
neither spoke with Mr. Barlow during the eight month charging period 
nor did any investigation into the allegations. Mrs. Barlow simply 
testified that she received payments from the State and had no other 
contact with Mr. Barlow. Ms. Hunter also had no contact with 
Mr. Barlow and could only say that less than full support obligation 
was paid. Finally, Kelly Page observed Mr. Barlow after the 
charging period, while Crystal Larsen spoke with Mr. Barlow by 
telephone, also after the charging period. 
D. The State Must Prove the Failure to Pay Was Without Just 
Cause. 
In State v. Bess, 44 Utah 39, 137 P.2d 829 (1913), the Utah 
Supreme Court reversed a conviction for criminal non-support. The 
court concluded that the state failed to show, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that Bess1 failure to pay was wilful and without just 
4Mr. Barlow conceded that his children were under the age 
of sixteen, were in needy circumstances, and that he made only 
partial payments during the eight month period. 
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excuse. Id. at 832.5 The Court concluded that "the record clearly 
shows that the defendant cannot, under any theory of the case, be 
legally convicted of the crime charged in the information." Id. 
An accused cannot be convicted of criminal non-support if 
he is "financially unable to provide support and his poverty is not 
self-induced." See Taylor v. State, 710 P.2d 1019, 1021 (Ak. App. 
1985)(State required to establish as elements of offense that 
accused had financial ability to pay support). The State must show 
that "accused either actually had funds available for payment of 
support or that he could have obtained such funds though reasonable 
efforts" .Id. at 1021. 
Here, the State presented no evidence to show that Mr. 
Barlow actually had the funds available to pay or could have 
obtained the funds through reasonable efforts. Nor did the State 
establish as an element of the offense that Mr. Barlow had the 
financial ability to pay. See Taylor, 710 P.2d at 1021. In short, 
the State presented no evidence to show that Mr. Barlow had the 
ability to pay child support or could obtain the money through 
reasonable efforts. 
5In Bess, the State presented evidence showing that the two 
children living with Mrs. Bess were in needy circumstances. 
However, the undisputed evidence also showed that Mr. Bess1 
necessary expenses far exceeded his earnings and that he made good 
faith efforts to support the children. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr, Barlow respectfully requests that the court arrest 
judgment and enter an order of dismissal. 
it DATED this lb day of April, 1992. 
4>ft,.JZPrr*a5&-
RICHARD P. MAURO 
Attorney for Defendant 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Attorney 
General's Office, State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
this day of April, 1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM - 3312 
Attorney General 
JEFFREY C. HUNT - 4988 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for the plaintiff 
120 North 200 West 
Fourth Floor 
P.O. Box 1980 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-1980 
Telephone: (801) 538-4660 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, ! 
Plaintiff, j 
VS. 1 




t Criminal No. 
Bail $2,500 
COUNT NO. I 
CRIMINAL NON-SUPPORT, a Class "A" Misdemeanor, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or between January 1, 1991 through 
August 31, 1991, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 7, Section 
201, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, 
Elroy Taylor Barlow, did knowingly and without just cause, fail 
to provide for the support of his minor child(ren), to-wit: Rocky 
02/02/80, and Nicholas 09/23/84, said child(ren) being in needy 
circumstances: 





COUNT NO. I: Affiant, Lesli J. Hunter, Criminal Nonsupport Agent 
for the Attorney General's Office received information from 
Kathleen Barlow, that the defendant, the natural parent of minor 
child(ren), Rocky 02/02/80, and Nicholas 09/23/84, has failed to 
provide for the support of his child(ren). Defendant is 
obligated to pay $150.00 per month per child pursuant to support 
order C85-1381 for the support of his child(ren). Between 
January 1, 1991 through August 31, 1991 the defendant should have 
paid $2,400.00, but has only paid $437.00 for the support of his 
child (ren), and the child (ren) of the Defendant have been in 
necessitous circumstances during the time period charged. 
DATED this «?$" day of IMpt 199 / . 
AFFIANT 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this ^^ day of 
CIRCUIT JUDGE 
This information is based on evidence obtained from the 
following witnesses: 
Lesli J. Hunter 
Kathleen Wayne 
AUTHORIZED FOR PRESENTMENT 
AND FILING: 
Defendant's Address: 
Elroy Taylor Barlow 
3165 West 3835 South, #F-101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
JEFFREY C. HUNT 
Assistant Attorney General 
76-7-104 CRIMINAL CODE 
other prosecution of defendant for similar act triz was first defiled by defendant or some 
alleged to have been committed within same ether person was not germane to any issue in 
period and within same jurisdiction; it was oth- case, and was, therefore, wholly immaterial 
orwise if adulterous act was alleged to have snd should have been gyrlpdtd as prejudicial 
been committed at particularly described to defendant State v. Hansen, 40 Utah 418, 
place. State v. Sheffield, 45 Utah 426, 146 P. 122 P 375 (1912) 
306 (1915). 
admission of adultery, defendant convicted of criminal concurrence of two persons, and may latter could not object to information as duplie- * ! • ^«mmit ted no^thstanding failure 
itous where he had interposed no special de- <* femmle to c0 0**0 1«*« k**1 "»paaty to 
s ^ t a S and h a d ^ a t v J " £ S 5 * £ ^ «• State v. Wade. 66 Utah 267.241 P. 888 
examination as to adultery, by failure to move (1925). 
to quash duplicitous information charging both Presumptions. 
oo, *o4 r. *ov ix?^o;. n ^ fourteen-year-old prosecutrix was iinmar-
Issues, ried, in absence of evidence to contrary. State 
In prosecution for adultery, whether prosecu- v. Wade, 66 Utah 267, 241 P. 838 (1925). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 2 Am. Jur. 2d Adultery and tery and fornication criminal offenses, 41 
Fornication i 2. AXJL3d 1338. 
CJS. - 2 CJS. Adultery I 3. Key Numbers, — Adultery «• L 
AXJL — Validity of statute making adul-
76-7-104. Fornication. 
(1) Any unmarried person who shall voluntarily engage in sexual inter-
course with another is guilty of fornication. 
(2) Fornication is a class B misdemeanor. 
History: C. 1953, 76-7-104, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, I 76-7*104. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 2 Am. Jur. 2d Adultery and tery and fornication criminal offenses, 41 
Fornication f 8. AXJL3d 1338. 
CJS. — 37 CJS. Fornication I 2. Key Numbers. — Fornication «• L 
AJJEL — Validity of statute making adul-
PART 2 
NONSUPPORT AND SALE OF CHILDREN 
76-7-201. Criminal nonsupport 
(1) A person commits criminal nonsupport if, having a spouse or children 
under the age of sixteen years, he knowingly and without just cause fails to 
provide for the support of the spouse or children when either is in needy 
circumstances. 




OFFENSES AGAINST THE FAMILY 76-7-201 
(3) Criminal nonsupport is a felony of the third degree under the following 
circumstances: 
(a) If the actor has been convicted one or more times of nonsupport, 
whether in this state or any other state; or 
(b) If the actor committed the offense while residing in another state. 
(4) For purposes of this section "child" includes a child born out of wedlock 
whose paternity has been admitted by the actor or has been established in a 
civil suit 
(5) In a prosecution under this section, it is no defense that the person to be 
supported received necessary support from a source other than the defendant. 
History: C. 1953, 70.7-201, enacted by L. 
1973, eh. 196,1 76-7-201; 1974, eh. 32,1 21. 
Cross-References. — Power of juvenile 
court, i 76-3a*l et aeq. 
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support 
Act, f 77-31-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Defenses. 
Duty of father. 
—In general 
—Relief from duty to support. 
Failure of nonresident to support 
Just 
Defenses. 
Under former Penal Code provision on deser-
tion of family it was no defense that destitute 
children were relieved by charitable acts of 
third persons. State v. Bess, 44 Utah 39,137 P. 
829 (1913). 
Duty of father. 
—In general 
It was duty of father to support his minor 
children if he was able to do so; and it was 
criminal offense willfully to fail to support 
one's minor children under age of sixteen 
years. Burbidge v. Utah Light & Traction Co., 
55 Utah 566, 196 P. 556 (1921); Ex>ckwood v. 
Rockwood, 65 Utah 261, 236 P. 457 (1925). 
•—Relief from duty to support 
Court had no right to make final order per-
manently relieving father of his obligation to 
support his child, except under the Adoption 
Statute. Riding v. Riding, 8 Utah 2d 136, 329 
P.2d 878 (1958). 
Failure of nonresident to support 
Husband who was resident of another state 
could be charged with offense of failure to pro-
vide in state in which he had permitted bis 
wife or children to live, or in which his miscon-
duct had induced them to seek refuge. Osborn 
v. Harris, 115 Utah 204, 203 P.2d 917 (1949). 
Just cause. 
Under former I 76-15-1, it must have been 
shown beyond reasonable doubt that children 
were in destitute and necessitous circum-
stances, and father must have willfully ne-
glected and refused, without just cause, to pro* 
vide for children; if it appeared that current 
and necessary expenses for himself and chil-
dren exceeded his earnings, that he had not 
remained idle when he could have obtained 
employment, and had not wasted any part of 
his earnings, he should have been acquitted. 
State v. Bess, 44 Utah 39,137 P. 829 (1913). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 41 Am. Jur. 2d Husband 
and Wife I 329. 
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AJLJL — Homicide by withholding food, 
clothing, or shelter, 61 AXJUd 1207. 
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1
 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 
3 THE COURT: Okay. Call the matter of the State of Utah 
* vs. Elroy Barlow, 911011470. Let the record reflect that this 
5 matter is on for sentencing. It also is on for a motion that was 
6 filed by the defense attorney, motion to arrest judgment or 
7 setting aside, in non-legal terms for the audience, if they're 
8 interested, setting aside the verdict of guilty— 
9 MR. MAURO: That's correct. 
10 THE COURT: —entered by the jury. 
11 MR. MAURO: That's right. 
12 THE COURT: I've read the memorandum, had a chance to 
13 go back over it, I don't know whether you want to argue your 
14 motion, or what you want to do on that. 
15 MR. MAURO: I just briefly want to indicate to the 
16 Court, I think Utah's statute is different than many of the other 
17 ones, a similar statute that I could find was Alaska, and I've 
18 provided you the case from Alaska. I've looked at case law in 
19 Washington, Oregon, California, Colorado, they all have a prima 
20 facie statute which says# once the State shows that he's not 
21 paid, the State has met its prima facie case, for whatever 
22 reason, and then the defendant can rebutt that. 
23 Utah, like Alaska, does not have that statute, so what 
24 that—what that causes—what that compels the State to do under 
25 the Constitution is to bring forward evidence to show that the 
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1
 payment was without just cause, i.e., to show that he had the 
2
 financial resources and that there was no reason to—for him not tcj> 
3 pay. 
4 m this case, the State didn»t do that and whether 
5 thatfs a problem that the legislature has in not making their 
6 law tough enough like—or I guess if that's the way to put it, 
? then, such as Washington, Oregon, California, Colorado, which has 
8 a prima facie statute, Utah has no prima facie statute; therefore, 
9 the State has the burden of proving each and every element of the 
10 crime as listed in the statute, and there are four; that he has 
11 children under 16 years of age, which we conceded; and that he 
12 knowingly failed to provide for their support, and I suppose to 
13 some extent, we conceded that he didn't pay the money that was 
14 required to pay; that his failure to provide the support was 
15 without just cause, and I think that is the element that we did 
16 not concede, and that is the element that I contend the State 
17 did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt with any evidence. 
18 And I briefly summarize the testimony of each of the 
19 witnesses— 
20 THE COURT: Right. 
21 MR. MAURO: —and I'm sure the Court remembers that 
22 testimony. On that basis, we would submit to the Court that 
23 they have failed to prove all of the elements of the crime as 
24 they1re required to do. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Hunt? 
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MR. HUNT: Well, just briefly, your Honor— 
THE COURT: Again, I've read the memorandums, so— 
MR. HUNT: Okay. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. HUNT: I won't recapitulate. 
The—the State has provided evidence of Mr. Barlow's 
business and his own testimony that he actually worked during the 
time period charged, he testified to that. There's plenty of 
evidence for the jury, if they were to disregard Mr. Barlow's 
defense, which they have a right to do, there was plenty of 
evidence taken in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict 
to substantiate a finding of just cause. He owns a business, he 
admitted that he was working during that time, that he—there 
were officers that went out—an officer that went out to his 
business, he was working there; that was after, shortly after 
the time period charged, admittedly, but—but still, there's 
plenty of evidence that that business was up and running and 
going and the payments were not being made. 
It's—there's—that is fine. I think that the defense 
would ask this Court to impose a burden on the State that's 
unrealistic and not contemplated by the statute, and that is to 
require us to disprove any conceivable defense that Mr. Barlow 
may raise in our case in chief, and I don't think that that's 
contemplated by the legislature, and I don't think that—that the 
Court should impose a burden like that on the State. It would 
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS 
10 WEST BROADWAY, SUITE 200 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
1
 make it impossible to ever try any of these—these cases. 
2 i think that if the—given the power of the jury to 
3 weigh the evidence, I think that there was—weigh the 
4 credibility of the evidence, I think that there was ample 
5 evidence to show that it was without just cause* 
6 THE COURT: Okay. Anything else, real briefly? 
7 MR. MAURO: Just briefly. I think the legislature has 
8 made the choice of passing the statute and requiring the State 
9 to prove each and every element beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
10 legislature has the choice of implementing or enacting a prima 
11 facie statute, like several of the other states throughout the 
12 nation; this legislature has chosen not to do that. Therefore, 
13 the State has the burden of proving each of those elements and 
14 bringing forward evidence to convince a jury or trier of fact 
15 beyond a reasonable doubt that that's the case. I submit they 
16 didn't do that. 
17 THE COURT: All right. Well, I agree with you, 
18 Mr. Mauro, that the State has to prove the elements beyond a 
19 reasonable doubt. I think that that's the way our law reads; 
20 however, I think that the jury and the trier of facts can look 
21 at circumstantial evidence to reach those decisions. 
22 I think that what the State showed is that Mr. Barlow 
23 was working, he was capable of working, whether he chose to be 
24 involved in a business that wasn't making any money, even though 
25 they did show that there was even a second income coming into the 
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 household during part of this time, he chose not to pay his child 
2
 support, for whatever reason. I think Mr. Barlow tried to rely 
3
 on a defense that he really couldnft work very many days because 
4 he had medical problems that kept him from working, therefore, 
5
 there wasn't enough income coming in. 
6
 I think the jury as the trier of fact chose to disbelief 
7
 that testimony, and even though the Court—and I am not reaching 
8 any kind of conclusions, but even if maybe it had been tried to 
9 the Court, the Court might have reached a different conclusion; 
10 for whatever reason, the parties chose to try this to a jury, and 
11 the jury became the trier of facts, and they chose not to believe—| 
12 give any credibility to Mr. Barlow's testimony whatsoever. They 
13 chose not to believe, he's not a medical expert, they chose not to 
14 believe his medical testimony, there were no other witnesses here 
15 in regards to the medical testimony; they chose to believe that 
16 he was capable of working, that he could have worked, that income 
17 could have been coming in and that payments could have been made 
18 for the support of those children. 
19 And I think that that was their question, and I think 
20 that the State did meet the burden that they had to meet. It may 
21 have not been the strongest case, but—but the jury reached the 
22 verdict after judging the credibility of all of the witnesses, and 
23 they reached a verdict of guilty. 
24 And I can see in viewing the evidence in the light most 
25 favorable to the jury verdict, which I think this Court has to do, 
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1 I think that there's a—that the jury was capable of coming in 
2 with a guilty verdict and looking at the credibility of the 
3 witnesses. 
4 So, I'm going to deny your motion. I think that, 
5 obviously, it's up to the Court of Appeals, if they decide that 
6 the burden is different than this Court feels that the burden is# 
7 or if they decide that the evidence really wasn't there, then 
8 that will be their decision. 
9 And I'm going to go ahead and sentence your client 
10 today. Is there any legal reason we shouldn't proceed with 
11 sentencing today? 
12 MR. MAURO: No, we are prepared. 
13 THE COURT: Do you have the pre-sentence report again? 
14 MR. MAURO: I think I gave that back to you. 
15 THE COURT: Okay. 
16 MR. MAURO: And I would want to approach with a letter 
17 from his doctor. We—we would ask— 
18 THE COURT: Is it different than the one that's 
19 contained with the pre-sentence report? 
20 MR. MAURO: I think it's probably the same one. 
21 THE COURT: The one that's in the back here. 
22 (Inaudible) 
23 THE COURT: Yeah, I've read that, a copy of that. 
24 MR. MAURO: Okay* We would ask the Court to impose 
25 sentence today and ask the Court to stay the imposition of that 
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ADDENDUM B 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
You are instructed that the offense of Criminal Non-
Support is committed not only where there is a complete failure 
to support the child, but also where there is a partial failure 
to provide for the children, so long as the support furnished is 
not adequate under the circumstances. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Before you can convict the defendant of the crime of 
Criminal Non-Support of minor children, you must find from the 
following evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the 
following elements of the crime: 
1. That during the period on or before January 1, 1991 
through August 30, 1991, the defendant's children, Rocky 
02/02/80, and Nicholas 09/23/84, were in needy circumstances. 
2. That the defendant knowingly and without just cause 
failed during any month or combination of months during the time 
period charged to provide the support assistance required by said 
children. 
3. That the children of the defendant, during the above 
mentioned period of time, resided and lived in Salt Lake County, 
Utah. 
If you believe that the evidence established each and all 
of the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt, it is your duty to convict the defendant. On the other 
hand, if the evidence has failed to so establish one or more of 
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j to fix my stepson's ^vehicle, so they'd have something to 
2 drive9 and I did in turn let them have the phone and a couple 
3 of things there at their shop temporarily until we could find 
4 a spot. 
5 Q So you worked at M & R Enterprises during the 
6 month of September, is that correct? 
7 A Well, we didn't do any work, but yeah—officially, 
8 I guess so, yeah. 
9 Q What is your current income level? 
10 MR. MAURO: Objection, your Honor. Relevance.. 
11 THE COURT: Sustained. 
12 Q (By Mr. Hunt) What are your current circumstances, 
13 Mr. Barlow? 
14 MR. MAURO: Objection, your Honor. Relevance. 
15 THE COURT: Sustained. 
16 Q (By Mr. Hunt) Since the filing of this action, 
17 have you attempted to catch up on y o u r — 
18 MR. 24AURO: Objection, your Honor. 
19 Q (By Mr. Hunt) — p a s t support— 
20 MR. MAURO: Relevance. 
21 THE COURT: Sustained. 
22 MR. HUNT: Well/ your Honor, may we approach? 
23 THE COURT: You may. 
24 (Whereupon, an off-the-record discussion was held 
25 at side bar.) 
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1 THE COURT: I'll allow him to answer that question. 
2 I'll overrule the objection. 
3 And we'll give you an opportunity to make a record. 
4 Q {By Mr. Hunt) Now# Mr. Barlow, what are your 
5 current circumstances right now? Are you working? Are you 
6 employed? 
7 A Well, we're ready to start a consulting business. 
8 Q You're not working now; is that what— 
9 A No. I'm not working this very minute, no. 
10 Q Okay. Do you have any ailments, have you gone in to 
11 FHP this month, do you have any ailments now that make it so 
12 that you cannot make payments— 
13 MR. MAURO: Again, I object, your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: That one's sustained. 
15 MR. HUNT: I don't have anything further. 
16 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Mauro, any questions? 
17 Anything on redirect at this point? 
18 MR. MAURO: Yeah, just a few follow-up. 
19 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
20 BY MR. MAURO: 
21 I Q During the time period in questionf was M & R 
22 Enterprises a profitable business? 
23 A We was at a loss. 
24 Q Why was that? 
25 A Well, we just hadn't been making a profit. 
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1 to call Kathleen Barlow as a rebuttal witness, 
2 THE COURT: Okay. 
3 Okay. Ms. Barlow, if you'd come back up and take 
4 the stand, I remind you that you've previously been sworn 
5 to tell the truth here today under pains and penalties of 
6 perjury. You're still under oath. 
7 You may proceed. 
8 KATHLEEN_ BARLOW, 
9 recalled as a rebuttal witness by and on behalf of the State 
10 in this matter, after having been previously duly sworn, 
11 assumed the witness stand, and was examined and testified 
12 further as follows: 
13 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
14 BY MR. HUNT: 
15 Q Ms. Barlow, did—excuse me—did Mr. Barlow ever 
16 suffer any long-term debilitating illnesses or injuries during 
17 your marriage to him? 
18 A No. He didn't. 
19 Q Okay. During the period that you were married to 
20 Mr. Barlow—what period of time are we talking about, first 
21 of all? 
22 A We got married in 1977 and we separated in '84. 
23 Q During that time that you were married to Mr. Barlow, 
24 ck> you recall his making—Mr. Barlow— 
25 THE COURT: I guess what—before you proceed, I'm 
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going to ask the members of the jury to please go out and 
wait out in the hall, I think the Court wants to be satisfied 
3 I with the admissibility of this testimony before it's intro-
M duced to the jury, so if youfd give us about five or ten 
5 minutes, and we'll call you back in when we're ready* Thank 
7 (Whereupon, the jury was excused from the 
Courtroom.) 
THE COURT: Okay. Let the record reflect that all 
members of the jury are outside of the courtroom. 
Why don't you proffer—where are you going with 
this? 
MR. HUNT: Well, where we're going, your Honor, is 
that Ms. Barlow heard conversations while they were married 
that Mr. Barlow had with a prior wife of his and other 
children that he had with her, in which he had claimed that he 
had been sick and ill, and unable to pay his support during 
this time period. 
Ms. Barlow knows those representations to have been 
not true. And they are the exact same claims that Mr. Barlow 
is making here today, and so I offer them as impeachment. 
THE COURT: I n — 
MR. HUNT: For impeachment purposes. 
THE COURT: Between 1S77 and 1984? Is that when 
these took place? 
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THE WITNESS: Yes, 
MR. MAURO: Well, Judge, number one, I think it's— 
I think it's hearsay, 'cause it's a—you know, you're going 
to say it's an admission; what it's an admission of? It's an 
admission of some prior bad act we don't know anything about. 
We don't have any records that indicate—there's no way to 
rebutt that claim, we haven't been provided any records about 
some sort of past child support obligations that we don't 
know anything about? 
THE COURT: How do we—how do we get around the 
privilege? They were married when these were made. 
MR. HUNT: The— 
THE COURT: They're not things that took place 
after the marriage. They're things that— 
MR. HUNT: Yeah. 
THE COURT: They're conversations that took place 
during the course of their marriage. 
MR. HUNT: Did any of these take place after you 
had separated or after you had 'divorced from him? 
THE WITNESS: No. His kids from his first marriage 
were already adopted by her husband. 
THE COURT: Did all of these take place while you 
were married? 
THE WITNESS: Uh huh (affirmative). 
THE COURT: All right. 
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1 MR. HUNT: Yeah, Article 1, Section 12. 
2 THE COURT: I just won't allow them, they're 
3 privileged. 
4 Okay. 
5 MR. HUNT: Okay. 
6 THE COURT: I think if it was acts against his 
7 own kids, the present kids, then they'd be admissible 
8 other—besides the privilege; but these aren't, they are 
9 conversations in regards to—to other children. 
10 MR. HUNT: And that is not the wife's privilege? 
11 Is that the husband's— 
12 THE COURT: It's the husband's privilege. 
13 MR. MAURO: Absolutely, no. State vs. Erickson— 
14 THE COURT: All right. So, I just—I don't think 
15 that she can go into that. 
16 Again, this is a criminal proceeding, it's not a 
17 civil proceeding. 
18 MR. HUNT: So, she wouldn't be able to give any 
19 testimony, whether it's conversations that they had between 
20 the two or Whether it is observations that she m a d e — 
21 THE COURT: Unless— 
22 MR. HUNT: — i n her testimony during t h e — 
23 THE COURT: Unless it's in furtherance of a crime, 
24 no, and it's not in furtherance of a crime. 
25 I'll have to disallow it. Is there anything else 
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- | Would you give each member of the jury of that? 
2 J Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I'm going to give 
3 you a copy of the jury instructions I'm going to be reading 
4 J to you, that way you can follow along with me, it makes it a 
5 little bit more interesting than my just reading these to 
6 j you; however, when you go in to deliberate, the only copy 
7 you can take with you will be my copy, the official Court 
8 copy, you'll have to leave those copies out here when you go 
9 J into the jury room. However, you are welcome to take them 
with you at the end of the proceedings, if you choose to do 
so. 
MR. HUNT: Your Honor, I'm sorry for interrupting. 
The State at this time would like to call one brief 
rebuttal witness. I don't think that it would take more than 
five or ten minutes, total, for—for the rebuttal witness. 
THE COURT: Well, let's have you—let me meet with 
you outside. Be in recess for two minutes. 
(Whereupon, the recess was taken.) 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Hunt, the Court having ruled 
that—we'll give you a chance to put things on the record, 
but the evidence that you were proposing to give would be 
inadmissible. 
Anything else that you have to present to the jury? 
MR. HUNT: Nothing further, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. All right. Ladies and 
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, statement as to what the law is. 
2 I Anything else? In regard to the jury instructions? 
3 , MR. MAURO: No. 
4 I THE COURT: Any objections or exceptions to the 
. jury instructions? 
6 MR. HUNT: No objections, your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: Okay. Now, before we get into the 
g mistrial, let's go back on the record and state, that when 
g we came back into Court this afternoon, the State wanted to 
call another rebuttal witness, being Leslie Hunter. 
The Court, outside the presence of the jury and out 
of the courtroom, had Mr. Hunt proffer what that testimony 
would be. Basically—and I'll let—I'll give you leave of the 
record, basically that it involved Mr. Barlow's past history 
of not paying, which I think was from about 1984 to 1987, 
where he didn't make adequate payments. At that time, 
another charge was brought against him and he proceeded to 
make full payments during the course of the prior proceedings 
and then started not making payments again. 
Mr. Hunt thought it should be admissible as showing 
prior plan or scheme. This Court felt, under—I think it's 
404 and 403, isn't it, that the evidence was too prejudicial, 
that it was nothing to show that it was any ongoing scheme 
of behalf of Mr. Barlow not to pay support in this particular 
instance, or any ongoing—didn't show any motive on his part. 
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1 That there was nothing to show that the circumstances at 
2 that time would have been the same as the circumstances at 
3 this time, and again, the Court did not allow it because it 
4 I didn't feel that it showed motive or scheme and the feeling 
5 J that it would be much too prejudicial for its probative 
6 value. 
7 Mr. Hunt, do you want leave of the record? Anything 
8 to add to that? 
9 MR. HUNT: Yes. The State just feels that under 
10 the case law submitted to the Court in its memorandum in 
11 opposition to the motion to suppress, that the State has 
12 addressed these arguments in State vs. Cobble, State vs. 
13 Karekis, I guess I'm saying that correctly, State vs. Brown, 
14 and State vs. McCartle, in that this evidence of prior scheme 
15 or prior plan can go to show motive, it can go to show 
16 intent, it can go to show knowledge, it can go—and the 
17 Supreme Court has allowed evidence of very similar wrongdoings 
18 in the past, and based upon that, it's the State's position 
19 that that evidence is admissible, even in the case in chief, 
20 but certainly to impeach the defendant's defense that this was 
21 caused by sickness, a period of sickness* 
22 So, the State would submit it on—the issue on that. 
23 THE COURT: Anything you want to add to the record 
24 in regards to that? 
25 MR. MAURO: Just—just, I think that basically what 
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1 we discussed. I think the common scheme or plan or a much, 
2 much narrower kind of thing, as in State vs. Morrell and 
3 State vs. Shickles, in those sorts of cases that talk about it. 
4 And we discussed that in the hall, and I think that I'd 
5 indicate that I think—I think that's what my position would 
6 be. 
7 THE COURT: That takes care of that. 
8 Now, do you have a motion to bring? 
9 MR. MAURO: Yeah. I have a motion for a mistrial 
10 to make, your Honor. I think the case that I have would be 
11 State vs. Troy, which talks about prosecutorial misconduct, 
12 and it sets out a two-pronged case. 
13 The first prong would be calling to the attention— 
14 calling to the attention of the jurors matters which would not 
15 be justified in considering—the juror would not be justified 
16 in considering in determining their verdict. And under the 
17 particular circumstances of the case, were the jurors probably 
18 influenced by. 
19 The first, clearly, in the prosecutor's argument 
20 that he had had discussions with Mr. Barlow and his discussion 
21 that the State had known about these medical records and had 
22 through Mr. Hunt—number one, made Mr. Hunt the witness, number 
23 two, I think it's just clearly, clearly improper argument to 
24 make to a jury, your Honor, that he somehow becomes a witness, 
25 that he somehow has evidence and he's conveyed that to the 
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1 we discussed, I think the common scheme or plan or a much, 
2 much narrower kind of thing, as in State vs. Morrell and 
3 State vs. Shickles, in those sorts of cases that talk about it. 
4 And we discussed that in the hall, and I think that I'd 
5 indicate that I think—I think that*s what my position would 
6 be. 
7 THE COURT: That takes care of that. 
8 Now, do you have a motion to bring? 
9 MR. MAURO: Yeah. I have a motion for a mistrial 
10 to make, your Honor. I think the case that I have would be 
11 State vs. Troy, which talks about prosecutorial misconduct, 
12 and it sets out a two-pronged case. 
13 The first prong would be calling to the attention— 
14 calling to the attention of the jurors matters which would not 
15 be justified in considering—the juror would not be justified 
16 in considering in determining their verdict. And under the 
17 particular circumstances of the case, were the jurors probably 
18 influenced by. 
19 The first, clearly, in the prosecutor's argument 
20 that he had had discussions with Mr. Barlow and his discussion 
21 that the State had known about these medical records and had 
22 through Mr. Hunt—number one, made Mr. Hunt the witness, number 
23 two, I think it's just clearly, clearly improper argument to 
24 make to a jury, your Honor, that he somehow becomes a witness, 
25 that he somehow has evidence and he's conveyed that to the 
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1 JurY without someone on the witness stand saying that. 
2 Number two, were they probably influenced? I think-
3 I think we need to look at what the jury's hearing, That— 
4 that the State prosecutor has this evidence, that the State 
5 prosecutor has known about this evidence, and no other 
6 witness on the State prosecutor's team knows about this 
7 evidence, but that the State prosecutor, not once, but twice, 
8 both in direct closing argument and again on rebuttal, tells 
9 the jury that Mr. Barlow has had communications with him 
10 regarding—regarding these medical bills and other matters. 
U I think that's, number one, clearly improper, 
12 number two, it's an improper way to get it into evidence. 
13 Mr. Hunt should become a witness in this case, if that is 
14 the case, and I think it would be inadmissible under the 
15 Rules of Evidence anyway, as some kind of a plea bargain; but 
16 Yett your Honor, were the jurors probably influenced? Well, 
17 certainly, I think they were. I think that's a logical 
18 conclusion that we can draw, in knowing that the State had 
19 this evidence. 
20 I'd submit it. 
2i THE COURT: Thank you. 
22 Any rebuttal to that, Mr. Hunt? 
23 MR. HUNT: Well, just very briefly, your Honor. 
24 The defendant is the on? that testified, himself, about our 
25 conversations. I was very careful, especially after the 
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1 Court's admonitions not to go into—although I don't think 
2 that any discussion of a civil settlement on this case would 
3 have been discussion of a plea bargain, as contemplated by the 
4 case law, I was still—be it as it may, I was still very 
5 careful not to bring up discussions of the civil settlement 
6 as well. 
7 And I stated no more than what Mr. Barlow testified 
8 to, and he himself opened that door. 
9 THE COURT: Okay. For the record, whether the 
10 Court feels that what Mr. Hunt argued was proper or improper, 
11 it was Mr. Barlow who testified himself, on the stand, that he 
12 had had discussions with Mr. Hunt at the office in regards to 
13 his inability to pay, if I remember the testimony correctly. 
14 I think that Mr. Hunt was cut off at a point that 
15 wasn't prejudicial to the defendant, and I think the Court 
16 also, in the course of the argument, gave the jury an oral 
17 question or instruction in the fact that what Mr. Hunt was 
18 saying was not testimony here today, he was not under oath, 
19 and in one instance, that they were to disregard what was said, 
20 The Court does not feel that what occurred arose to 
21 the threshold point of intentional or even inadvertentness 
22 or prosecutorial misconduct, and doesn't feel that a mistrial 
23 would be appropriate under these circumstances. 
24 All right• But your objection and your motion is 
25 I noted. 
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ADDENDUM E 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
It is your duty to determine your verdict solely up en the 
evidence introduced at the trial. For that purpose, you should 
consider all of the evidence together, fairly, impartially and 
conscientiously. You should not consider, nor be influenced by 
any staterents of counsel as to vhat evidence is, unless it is 
stated correctly, nor by any statement of counsel of facts not 
shown in evidence, if any such has been made. 
Where there is a conflict in the evidence you shoulc 
reconcile such conflict as far as you reasonably can. But 
where the conflict cannot be reconciled, you are the final 
judges and r.ust determine from the evidence vhat the facts 
are. There are no definite rules governing how you shall 
determine the weight or convincing force of any evidence, or 
how you shall determine vhat the facts in this case are. But 
you should carefully and conscientiously consider and corpare 
all of the testimony, and all of the facts and circumstances 
vhich have a bearing on any issue, and determine therefrcr what 
the facts are* 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
At times throughout the trial the court has been called upon 
to deterr.ine whether certain offered evidence might properly be 
admitted. You ere not to be concerned with the reasons for such 
rulings and are not to draw any inferences from them. Whether 
offered evidence is admissible is purely a question of law. In 
admitting evidence to which an objection is made, the court does 
not deterr.ine what weight would be given such evidence; nor does 
it pass or. the credibility of the witness. You are not to 
consider evidence offered but not admitted, nor any evidence 
stricken out by the court, as to any question to which an 
objection was sustained, you must not conjecture as to what the 
answer tight have been or as to the reason for the objection. 
ADDENDUM F 
INSTRUCTION NO. c 
The de*- \ 
charge of Criminal Non-Support ^ - upon State the 
burden t proving beyond a reasonable doubt all oi the elements 
c i. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
A person charged with a crime is presumed to be innocent 
until he is proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
presumption of innocence is not a mere form to be disregarded 
by the jury at pleasure, but is a substantial essential part of 
the law, intended, as far as human agency is capable, to guard 
against the danger of an innocent person being unjustly 
punished. 
The presumption of innocence must continue to prevail in 
the minds of the jury unless and until the jury is satisfied 
beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant. And 
in case of a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt, he 
is entitled to an acquittal. 
The burden is always upon the prosecution to prove guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. This burden never shifts to a 
defendant for the law never imposes upon a defendant in a 
criminal case the burden or duty of calling any witnesses or 
producing any evidence. 
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